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ABSTRACT 
 
The existence of firm size effects is well documented in the accounting and finance literatures. One 
stream of this research interprets firm size as a proxy for the amount of information available about 
the firm. This paper extends prior work in this area and demonstrates that the significance of the size 
effect is increased substantially by considering information demands of both debt and equity 
investors. A size proxy that includes the book value of outstanding debt is more highly associated with 
returns surrounding annual and quarterly earnings announcements than a measure based solely on 
the market value of common equity. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
tiase (1985) offers a firm size, differential predisclosure information hypothesis, (hereafter referred to 
as the Ainformation availability@ hypothesis) which suggests that the stock price response to firms= 
earnings announcements is inversely related to firm size (where firm size is measured by the market 
value of common equity). This research flows from a suggestion by Banz (1981) that observed size 
differences in empirical financial research may be attributable to differences in information availability. Under Atiase=s 
hypothesis, private predisclosure information production is an increasing function of firm size. Large firms face a greater 
demand for firm specific information due to greater incentives for information search. Large firms attract greater investor 
interest, financial analyst interest, press coverage, and institutional investor following. Therefore, the amount of 
unexpected information contained in an accounting earnings announcement is inversely related to firm size. This 
information availability hypothesis suggests that the larger the outside investor interest in a firm, the more likely that 
share prices will exhibit a smaller response to earnings announcements. 
 
Atiase (1985) offers empirical evidence supporting the information availability hypothesis for second quarter 
earnings announcements. Grant (1980) offers similar conclusions regarding annual earnings announcements, and also 
reports significance for an alternative predisclosure information proxy (the number of firm specific news items appearing 
in the Wall Street journal during the predisclosure period). Grant does not consider size directly, but compares typically 
larger exchange listed to smaller OTC firms.  Atiase (1987) extends his earlier analyses to annual announcements and 
offers support for both a size effect and an exchange listing effect
1
 in explaining cross-sectional differences in security 
price response to accounting earnings announcements. Dempsey (1989) provides evidence of a size effect surrounding 
annual announcements and reports significance for a Anumber of analysts@ variable, which is claimed as a proxy for the 
amount of predisclosure information. 
 
This paper follows Atiase=s basic approach in hypothesizing that the market response to earnings may be 
partially explained by the differential availability of firm-specific, predisclosure information. However, the focus here is 
on the information demand of all long-term outside investors, rather than just common stockholders. Firms with relatively 
large balances of outstanding long-term debt (e.g., utilities) and/or preferred stock should generate similar availability of 
information to an all-equity firm of the same relative size
2
. For example, it is well known that many closely held firms 
                                                 
1The exchange listing effect is not considered in this study. All sample firms are listed for trading on the NYSE,  AMEX or NASDAQ. 
2Information demands of preferred shareholders or lenders may differ from those of common shareholders. For example, since debt 
represents a senior security, these outside investors may be less interested in the variance of returns. The information needs of 
A 
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will produce audited financial statements (and accompanying GAAP disclosures) to comply with covenants of bank 
lending agreements. Information needs of preferred shareholders could likewise generate an interest in firm-specific 
information. 
 
If this information availability hypothesis holds, then a measure of firm size which includes information 
demands of preferred shareholders and bondholders will provide incremental explanatory power for abnormal returns 
surrounding earnings releases, even after considering a proxy which relies solely on the market value of common shares. 
 
The results presented here indicate that the market value of common equity generally provides a suitable proxy 
for information availability in explaining cross-sectional differences in the price response to earnings, consistent with 
prior research. However, when the analysis is limited to firms for which long-term debt represents a more important part 
of total invested capital, the debt variable provides incremental explanatory power for the observed cross-sectional 
differences. Thus, the information demand of preferred shareholders and long-term debtholders provides an important, 
additional controlling variable for accounting research studies comparing firms with varying capital structures. 
 
The following section presents the research design and discusses sample selection. The third section summarizes 
the results of the empirical tests. Tentative conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented in 
the final section. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
The study includes both annual and second quarter earnings announcement dates. The annual sample covers the 
twenty years from 1985 through 2004, while the quarterly sample includes the ten years from 1985 through 2004. 
 
In order to be included in the study, firms must be: (1) listed for trade on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ 
national exchanges, (2) included on the daily CRSP returns database, (3) included on both the annual and quarterly 
COMPUSTAT database, (4) have a December 31 fiscal year-end, (5) be a nonfinancial firm (excludes SIC codes 6000-
6999), (6) annual and quarterly announcements available in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) during any of the test periods, 
and (7) had no earnings forecasts, merger or divestiture activity, dividend or stock split announcements published in the 
WSJ during the same calendar week as the earnings announcement. 
 
Necessary book value information and earnings announcement dates are collected from COMPUSTAT and 
weekly returns are calculated using the CRSP database. Firms with missing CRSP data (more than 20 daily returns during 
the various estimation periods) or COMPUSTAT data on the variables required for the analyses are eliminated. Firms 
with a zero total book value for long-term debt plus preferred stock are also eliminated, to better focus on the variables of 
interest. 
 
Earnings announcement dates are originally obtained from quarterly COMPUSTAT and cross-checked to the 
WSJ Index. If the WSJ date failed to fall within the same calendar week as the COMPUSTAT date, the firm is eliminated 
from the sample. If the WSJ Index did not note the earnings announcement, the firm is deleted.  The sample data sets 
include 15,064 annual and 10,496 second quarterly earnings announcements. The samples are each divided into two 
subsamples of large and small firms, based on rankings of size measured by the natural log of the market value of equity 
(LMVE). Firms are ranked by LMVE and divided into three equal groups
3
. Firms in the lowest third are classified as 
small, the highest third are classified as large and the middle third are excluded. The final samples include 10,042 annual 
                                                                                                                                                             
common shareholders and other outside investors may not be linearly related. The issuance of new debt may provide for increased 
information through various debt covenants. Such information demands may cease to exist when the debt is repaid. These are open 
empirical questions which this paper addresses only indirectly. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) propose that there is an informational role of debt for common shareholders. Under their hypothesis, debt and 
its related contractual costs serve as a further restriction on the activities of management. These restrictions provide incremental 
information to common shareholders.  
3Large and small firm subsamples are defined based on the LMVE variable. An alternative sort based on LDEBT (not tabulated) 
produces qualitatively similar results. Table 1 presents data for the annual announcements. Quarterly data are qualitatively similar and 
not tabulated. 
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and 6,996 quarterly announcements. 
 
Research Design 
 
Returns are divided into a non-report and a report period. The report period is the five weeks centered on the 
earnings announcement date. The non-report period includes a minimum of 104 weeks ended at the start of the report 
period. The non-report period begins in the third week of December (June for quarterly announcements) two years prior 
to the announcement date. The length of the non-report period varies, dependent on the announcement date. 
 
Tests performed include associations of the firm size variables with unexpected security returns. Unexpected 
returns are extracted using the market model, regressing weekly return relatives for individual firms on the weekly market 
return relatives for the non-report periods. He market model is run using the CRSP value-weighted index. Unexpected 
returns are calculated as: 
 
uit = Rit - [ ai + bi Rmt ] 
where:  uit = unexpected weekly return relative for firm i in week t, and 
Rit , Rmt = realized weekly return relatives for firm i and the market index, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Patell=s (1976) Revaluation Index (RI) is used as the dependent variable, and calculated as follows: 
RIit = [ Uit
2
 / CitSi
2
 ] x [ (T-4) / (T-2) ]. 
 
Distributional properties of RI are summarized in Atiase (1985: 27-28). The report week RI is a measure of the 
amount of new information conveyed by the earnings report, relative to the information during the non-report periods. 
The measure allows each firm to serve as its own endogenous control. E(RIi0) = 1.0, therefore, observed RI i0 greater than 
1.0 indicate that the earnings report conveys new information. 
 
Independent Size Variables 
 
Independent regression variables are alternative firm size measures (LMVE and LDEBT). Complete variable 
definitions are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 also presents summary descriptive statistics for the annual earnings sample
4
. Since distributions of the 
size variables are highly skewed, natural logs of these variables are used in the analyses. Use of logs reduces the 
dispersion and minimizes the effects of extreme observations, as can be seen in Table 1.  
 
The size measures are cross-correlated and Pearson correlations are summarized in Table 2. Correlations are 
high as expected (annual = .72 and quarterly = .69). Larger equity firms are likely to have relatively larger amounts of 
debt and preferred stock. Covariability appears to present less of a problem for the subsamples of large and small firms. 
The correlation of LMVE and LDEBT is only .46 and .33 for the small and large firm annual subsamples (.48 and .24 for 
the quarterly subsamples). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4Descriptive statistics for the quarterly sample (untabulated) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Annual Sample 
 
Size Variable5 Mean STD Q1 Q2 Q3 
All firms (n = 10,042)     
MVE 1053.13 1929.23 75.55 322.33 1087.15 
DEBT 581.60 1223.03 24.56 118.33 545.85 
LMVE 5.66 1.78 4.32 5.77 6.99 
LDEBT 4.65 2.17 3.20 4.77 6.30 
Small firms (n=5,021)     
MVE 49.94 35.31 19.48 40.55 75.57 
DEBT 47.51 87.03 6.39 20.24 49.88 
LMVE 3.59 0.86 2.96 3.70 4.32 
LDEBT 2.77 1.68 1.85 3.00 3.90 
Large firms (n= 5,021)     
MVE 2748.50 2603.42 1086.60 1790.88 3253.37 
DEBT 1385.95 1810.28 238.20 700.65 1738.29 
LMVE 7.61 0.73 6.99 7.49 8.08 
LDEBT 6.34 1.58 5.47 6.55 7.46 
 
Variable Definitions 
MVE = Market value of common equity, 
DEBT = Book value of long-term debt plus preferred equity, 
LMVE = Natural of MVE, 
and LDEBT = Natural log of DEBT. 
 
 
Table 2 
Pearson Correlations Among Size Variables 
 
Annual Earnings Announcements 
 All Firms 
(n = 10,492) 
Small Firms 
(n= 5,021) 
Large Firms 
(n= 5,021) 
 LDEBT LDEBT LDEBT 
LMVE .7231 .4562 .3319 
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 
Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
 All Firms 
(n =6,996) 
Small Firms 
(n= 3,498) 
Large Firms 
(n= 3,498) 
 LDEBT LDEBT LDEBT 
LMVE .6924 .4792 .2499 
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 
 
 
Regression Models 
 
Both univariate and multivariate models are employed to explore the relation between the market response and 
the alternative firm size variables. The following models are used for both the annual and quarterly analyses: 
Model 1: RI i0 = b0 + b1 LMVE i + e i 
Model 2:  RI i0 = b0 + b1 LDEBT i + e i 
Model 3:  RI i0 = b0 + b1 LMVE i + b 2 LDEBT i + e i 
 
                                                 
5 All size variables are based on beginning of the year values. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 3 summarizes observed average RI i t for both annual and quarterly announcements. As can be seen in the 
Table, the highest RI is observed during the announcement week, consistent with Atiase=s (1985, 1987) findings. Table 3 
also indicates that small firms RI=s are higher than those for large firms, again consistent with the Atiase findings. 
 
Table 3 
Average Revaluation Indices 
 
Annual Earnings Announcements 
  Week in Report Period Relative to Report Week 
Sample n -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
All firms 10,042 .899 .984 1.559* 1.165 .989 
Small firms 5,021 .879 .977 1.976* 1.228 .957 
Large firms 5,021 .908 .961 1.265 1.114 .981 
Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
  Week in Report Period Relative to Report Week 
Sample n -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
All firms 6,996 .917 .929 1.526* 1.112 1.114 
Small firms 3,498 .878 .931 1.657* 1.139 1.123 
Large firms 3,498 .957 .927 1.389 1.084 1.104 
* Indicates significantly greater than the mean at less than the .01 level. 
 
 
Average report week RIs across all firms are 1.559 and 1.526, respectively, for annual and quarterly 
announcements. Given an expected value of 1.00, report weeks contain 55.9% and 52.6% more information than other 
weeks in the RP (significant at the .01 level). Results for small firms are similar. The average report week RI is 1.976 for 
annual announcements (1.657 for quarterly announcements), again significantly greater than the average RI of the RP at 
the .01 level. The large firms also generate increased RI during the report week, but these are not significantly greater 
than 1.00. 
 
Regression Results 
 
Annual Earnings Announcements 
 
Table 4 summarizes results surrounding annual announcements. As shown in Panel A, univariate analyses 
(Models 1 and 2) generate significant, negative coefficients as expected. Based on these results, there is a significant 
inverse relation between RIi0 and size, regardless of the firm size proxy employed (LMVE or LDEBT).
6
 
 
The LMVE results are consistent with annual findings reported by Atiase (1987) and with second quarter results 
reported by Atiase (1985). 
 
Table 4 presents Model 3 multivariate results for the regression of RIi0 on both LMVE and LDEBT. The 
coefficient for LMVE remains positive and highly significant. However, the LDEBT coefficient is no longer significant. 
The linear explanatory power of LDEBT appears subsumed by the equity size measure. 
 
                                                 
6Initial inspection of the firm size measures (LMVE and LDEBT) indicates moderate growth (i.e., nonstationarity) over time. For 
example, in the annual sample, mean LMVE grows from 5.38 to 5.83 over the test period, and mean LDEBT grows from 4.35 to 4.74. 
Following Dempsey (1989), the size measures are standardized (individual firm values are divided by annual sample median values) 
to facilitate intertemporal comparisons. This transformation of the data provides no qualitative differences in results and is excluded 
from presentation here. 
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Table 4 
Annual Earnings Announcement Regression Results 
Firms Sorted by LMVE 
 
Model b0 b1 b2 Adjusted R
2 F-Ratio 
Panel A: All firms (n = 10,042) 
1 2.891 -0.227  .01 22.562 
t-statistics 10.09*** -4.75***   .0001 
2 2.397 -0.170  .01 15.914 
t-statistics 10.89*** -3.99***   .0001 
3 2.880 -0.201 -0.029 .01 11.369 
t-statistics 10.01*** -2.61*** -0.43  .0001 
Panel B: Small firms (n = 5,021) 
1 5.513 -0.983  .01 17.623 
t-statistics 6.36*** -4.20***   .0001 
2 2.637 -0.238  .01 3.887 
t-statistics 6.73*** -1.97**   .0488 
3 5.509 -0.974 -0.010 .01 8.809 
t-statistics 6.34*** -3.70*** -0.07  .0002 
Panel C: Large firms (n = 5,021) 
1 0.650 .081  .01 2.492 
t-statistics 1.66* 1.58   ..1146 
2 1.390 -0.020  .00 0.694 
t-statistics 8.96*** -0.83)   .4051 
3 0.682 -0.107 -0.036 .01 2.283 
t-statistics 1.174* -1.97** -1.44  .1023 
*, **, *** - Indicates t-statistic significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels. 
 
 
Panels B and C offer results for the small and large firm subsamples, respectively. The small firm results in 
Panel B are essentially identical to those in Panel A. The size measures both indicate significance in the univariate 
analyses, but only LMVE is significant in the multivariate analysis (Model 3). 
 
Panel C results for the large firms differ markedly from those reported in Panels A and B. None of the univariate 
models generate significant coefficients for the size measures. The LMVE coefficient is significant in the multivariate 
analysis. This result is again generally consistent with Atiase (1985). 
 
Firms in Table 4 regressions are classified as large or small based on the value of LMVE, which may induce a 
bias toward significance for that size measure. Table 5 reports additional results to provide some insight into the extent of 
potential bias in Table 4. Classification of firms as large or small is repeated based on LDEBT. As shown in Table 5, the 
reclassification does not qualitatively alter the Table 4 results. 
 
Table 5 
Annual Earnings Announcement Regression Results 
Firms Sorted by LDEBT 
(All Firms: n = 10,042) 
 
Model b0 b1 b2 Adjusted R
2 F-Ratio 
1 3.243 -0.281  .01 28.336 
t-statistics 10.25*** -5.32***   .0001 
2 2.355 -0.153  .01 14.807 
t-statistics 11.20*** -3.85***   .0001 
3 3.285 -0.315 -0.032 .01 14.291 
t-statistics 10.04*** -3.70*** -0.50  .0001 
*, **, *** - Indicates t-statistic significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels. 
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Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 appear to indicate that the market value of common equity provides a 
sufficient control variable for the firm size effect. 
 
Annual Analyses Limited To Firms With Large Debt Balances 
 
Table 6 reports the results of additional regressions to further investigate the information demands of preferred 
shareholders and long-term debtholders. In Panel A, firms are first sorted into deciles, separately, based on LMVE and 
LDEBT. Those firms ranked in a higher decile for LMVE than for LDEBT are eliminated. Remaining firms are those for 
which LDEBT represents a proportionately larger share of the total capital structure. For those firms, the results are 
somewhat different. 
 
 
Table 6 
Annual Earnings Announcement Regression Results 
Model: RIi0 = b0 + b1LMVEi + b2LDEBTi + ei 
 
b0 b1 b2 Adjusted R
2 F-Ratio 
Panel A: Sorted by LMVE - Excludes firms with equity ranked higher than debt (n = 5,260) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
4.164 -0.545 -0.222 .01 10.603 
(7.54)*** (-3.67)*** (1.79)*  (.0001) 
Panel B: Sorted by DER - Excludes firms with large DER (n = 5,021) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
3.966 0.136 -0.539 .01 9.362 
(6.81)*** (0.44) (-1.76)*  (.0001) 
*, **, *** - Indicates t-statistic significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels. 
 
 
The univariate regression results (untabulated) continue to exhibit significant coefficients for both LMVE and 
LDEBT. However, when the multivariate regression is run, the results indicate significant coefficients for both variables. 
The linear explanatory power of LDEBT is no longer subsumed by LMVE. Thus, for firms with relatively more 
important debt and preferred shares in the capital structure, the LDEBT variable provides incremental explanatory power. 
 
Results in Panel B again attempt to isolate firms where debt and preferred stock represent a greater portion of 
total invested capital. Here, firms are ranked by their debt to equity ratios (DER). DER is calculated as DEBT / MVE, 
and does not represent a traditional debt to equity calculation. Instead, the ratio considers both long-term debt and 
preferred shares in relation to total capital investment. Panel B reports results for firms having the highest DER (as in 
prior sorts, firms are ranked from highest to lowest, with the middle 1/3 eliminated). Using this approach, univariate 
regressions still indicate significance for both size measures, but in the multivariate model, it is the LMVE variable whose 
explanatory power is now subsumed by the LDEBT measure. 
 
Quarterly Earnings Announcements 
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide summarized results for the quarterly announcement tests. Overall, the quarterly results 
mirror those for annual announcements. Coefficients for the univariate regressions (not tabulated) are negative and highly 
significant, both for the total sample and the two size subsamples. Table 7 reports multivariate regression results, using 
the alternative size measures to classify firms as large or small. As is true for the annual earnings announcements in 
Tables 4 and 5, the LMVE coefficient is negative and highly significant, while the LDEBT coefficient is insignificant. 
This result holds, regardless of the size measure used to classify firms as small or large. As with annual announcements, it 
appears that the linear explanatory power of LDEBT is subsumed by the LMVE firm size measure. 
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Table7 
Quarterly Earnings Announcement Regression Results 
(All Firms n = 6,996) 
Model: RIi0 = b0 + b1LMVEi + b2LDEBTi + ei 
 
b0 b1 b2 Adjusted R
2 F-Ratio 
Panel A: Sorted by LMVE 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
2.008 -0.109 0.026 .01 4.641 
(11.64)*** (-2.41)** (0.63)  (.0097) 
Panel B: Sorted by LDEBT 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
2.098 -0.146 0.056 .01 3.448 
(9.03)*** (-2.46)** (1.26)  (.0320) 
*, **, *** - Indicates t-statistic significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels. 
 
 
Table 8, Panel A replicates Table 6 results, using the quarterly data, and limiting the sample to those firms 
ranked higher for LDEBT than for LMVE. Once again, the quarterly results mirror the annual announcement results. 
Both LMVE and LDEBT provide significant explanatory power. In Panel B of Table 8, LDEBT provides significant 
incremental explanatory power, similar to the Panel A results. This result differs from annual results in Table 6 in that 
both variables are significant in the multivariate model, when firms are classified based on DER. 
 
 
Table 8 
Quarterly Earnings Announcement Regression Results 
Model: RIi0 = b0 + b1LMVEi + b2LDEBTi + ei 
 
b0 b1 b2 Adjusted R
2 F-Ratio 
Panel A: Sorted by LMVE - Excludes firms with equity ranked higher than debt (n = 3,263) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
2.520 -0.250 -0.124 .01 5.835 
(8.22)*** (-3.02)*** (1.75)*  (.0030) 
Panel B: Sorted by DER - Excludes firms with large DER (n = 3,498) 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
2.052 -0.163 -0.104 .01 3.015 
(7.51)*** -(2.43)** (1.79)*  (.0494) 
*, **, *** - Indicates t-statistic significant at the .10, .05 and .01 levels. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Prior research notes the existence of a firm size effect in explaining the relation between earnings 
announcements and security market response. A general conclusion from these studies is that research designs should 
include a conditioning variable for this effect. Atiase (1985, p.35) notes A...future empirical research designs requiring 
control for (private) predisclosure information should control for the capitalized value of sample firms. This is 
particularly important for studies aimed at testing the Aeconomic consequence@ and/or Aeffectiveness@ of new public 
information disclosure rules.@ If one accepts that the quality of the proxy can be evaluated by its relation with unexpected 
returns, then the results presented here indicate that an additional size measure which includes information demands of 
preferred shareholders and bondholders better proxies for the firm size effect than a measure based solely on the market 
value of common equity. The additional size measure provides significant incremental explanatory power, even after 
consideration of the market value of common equity. 
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The results presented here suggest that in studies comparing firms with different capital structures, an additional 
conditioning variable based on the book values of debt and preferred shares should be included. In fact, most accounting 
information content and economic consequences studies involve such comparisons. For example, King (1966) notes 
significance for an industry variable in explaining cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns. The industry effect 
may be due, in part, to capital structure differences across industries. Foster (1986, pp.187-189) documents considerable 
variation in capital structure (and other financial statement ratios) across industries. Debt to equity ratios for a sample of 
twelve industries range from 0.04 to 1.41 based on 1983 COMPUSTAT data. As securities markets become more global, 
researchers will also face potential inference problems due to international capital structure differences. 
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